The #Americans - Season 2

Key Findings

• Ahead of the 2026 U.S. midterm elections, Spamouflage-linked accounts and inauthentic pro-China accounts on X are posing as U.S. voters and posting divisive content about U.S. politics, social issues, and the elections. This mirrors tactics described in Graphika’s 2024 report, The #Americans.
• We identified three distinct activity sets:
  • Activity 1: A likely Spamouflage-linked account posting and amplifying divisive political content;
  • Activity 2: A small network of four accounts with Spamouflage histories amplifying a conservative persona with 14.7k followers;
  • Activity 3: A purchased, hijacked, or otherwise repurposed Philippine culture account amplified by Spamouflage and other pro-China inauthentic accounts.
• The accounts in activity sets 1-3 post across the political spectrum, frequently question election integrity and the legitimacy of US democracy, and amplify divisive narratives and content. In one case, an account used an AI-generated video to critique the democratic process.
• Gaining access to an established account with more than 200k followers, whether legitimately or not, gives Spamouflage content a built-in reach that most of its personas lack.
• Posts in all three activity sets contain full-width punctuation consistent with operators typing in English on Chinese-language keyboards, and most engagement comes from accounts within each network rather than authentic users.

Overview & Analysis

In the lead-up to the 2026 U.S. midterm elections, Graphika identified three sets of Spamouflage-linked activity on X. Across these sets, some accounts pose as Americans, others post divisive content about U.S. politics, social issues, and the elections, and the remainder amplify and engage with the posted content. The activity closely resembles tactics we documented ahead of the 2024 US presidential election in The #Americans, indicating the approach remains in use.

In two of the three cases, accounts with a history of typical Spamouflage activity, such as engaging with pro-China accounts on X and attacking Chinese dissident Guo Wengui and the Falun Gong spiritual group, shifted to U.S.-focused content. In the third, the operators appear to have taken over an authentic account, likely attempting to leverage its existing audience.

Characteristics: Same Old Story

The three activity sets share several features:

• Repurposed accounts. Each set relies on accounts with prior histories: an aged account with content dating back to 2013 (SpeedySMM), a Philippine culture account that was dormant from 2022 to 2024 (Coolture), and accounts that previously posted standard Spamouflage content (the Josiah Taylor amplifiers).
• Inconsistent partisan personas. As with The #Americans, the accounts post across the political spectrum. Coolture has posted both pro- and anti-Trump content alongside support for the American Communist Party, and one of Josiah Taylor’s MAGA-aligned amplifiers previously focused on the war in Gaza.
• Chinese-language artifacts. Posts or replies in all three sets contain full-width punctuation, consistent with operators typing English on a Chinese-language keyboard.
• Closed amplification loops. Most engagement comes from a small set of accounts within each network rather than from authentic users. The SpeedySMM account is an exception as it regularly generates both authentic and inauthentic engagement.
• Election-adjacent narratives. The accounts post content questioning election integrity and the legitimacy of U.S. democracy.

Activity 1: Standalone Account ‘SpeedySMM’

We assess that the X account @speedysmm4547 (13.7k followers) is the successor to @speedysmm, a now-removed account we previously linked to Spamouflage.

• The new account’s bio references the old account and tells users to follow the new one.
• Since June 2025, speedysmm4547 has posted and amplified divisive U.S. political content, including attacks on Democratic Party leadership during the October 2025 U.S. government shutdown and criticism of immigration policy.
• Until September 2012, the account posted unrelated content, which suggests an aged account that was purchased, hijacked, or primed by operators in case X actioned the original account. The account was dormant between 2012 and June 2025.
• Its posts and replies contain recurring linguistic artifacts consistent with an operator typing English on a Chinese-language keyboard, including full-width exclamation marks and commas.

The original @speedysmm account consistently interacted with other pro-China X accounts, including pro-China influencers and a Chinese consulate account. At least one exchange indicates the operator almost certainly reads Chinese. In 2023, it shifted to engaging with accounts posting content supportive of U.S. President Donald Trump.

Activity 2: A MAGA Persona + Amplification Network

We identified a small cluster of four accounts with a history of Spamouflage activity that now amplify @JosiTaylorah, a MAGA-styled persona with 14.7k followers. Before the 2024 presidential election, the account posted in poor English on topics it showed a limited grasp of. The account now focuses on divisive U.S. social issues and economic developments, such as mass shootings, immigration, and election integrity.

Four amplifying accounts share Spamouflage histories:

• @jspexplorer posted a Spamouflage graphic targeting Guo Wengui in February 2024. Since August 2026, it has replied almost exclusively to Taylor, often within 10 minutes.
• @ghosolutions, which has anti-Falun Gong language in its bio, posted Spamouflage graphics targeting Falun Gong and Guo Wengui in 2023 and 2024. The account also reposted known Spamouflage accounts. The account began amplifying @JosiTaylorah’s content in 2024, often attempting to sow doubt and distrust in U.S. institutions and elected officials.
• @DequanMerr34013 and @fortaleza_Mrs also have older Spamouflage posts. @fortaleza_Mrs has posted about the midterms, and @DequanMerr34013 has made contradictory claims about the location of the account’s owner.

An additional amplifying account and MAGA-styled persona, @Olivia1460029, uses the same profile image and American flag emojis as @JosiTaylorah. This account also posted content that displayed a poor grasp of conservative discourse, contradicting the account’s MAGA-styled persona. Another amplifying account, @graydpelan1, moved from posting cute animal content throughout 2023 to Gaza-focused posts in poor English (including an image with Chinese text) to engaging with @JosiTaylorah.

Activity 3: Account Takeover

Coolture (@cooltureph_) presents as a Philippine culture blog that now posts pro-China and divisive U.S.-focused content. We did not find open-source evidence to determine whether the account was hijacked or whether the original operator sold or otherwise lost control of it. As of Oct. 30, the account has 201.6k followers, most of which likely accumulated before it was taken over, giving it an audience most Spamouflage personas lack. Its posts typically receive several hundred views, but only a few dozen likes, replies, and reposts.

• Until 2022, it posted about Philippine food, culture, and lifestyle, often in Filipino.
• It went dormant in August 2022, and resumed posting on Nov. 30, 2024, a few weeks after the U.S. presidential election. After returning, it began posting pro-China content in English, including a video from Chinese state media outlet CCTV celebrating Macao's "return" to China, a tribute to Mao Zedong on his birthday, and support for the American Communist Party.

• In 2025, the account shifted almost entirely to U.S.-focused content, pushing divisive narratives and controversial content in the style documented in our 2024 report The #Americans.
  • It posted both pro- and anti-Trump content, posed as an American voter, opposed U.S. funding for Ukraine and U.S. trade wars, and used an AI-generated video to argue that the U.S. is an oligarchy rather than a democracy, casting doubt on the democratic process.
• We observed one post that casts the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement in a negative light—containing a full-width exclamation mark and grammatical errors consistent with an operator using a Chinese-language keyboard.

Coolture's posts are regularly amplified by three accounts we assess with high confidence are linked to Spamouflage. Spamouflage-linked accounts rarely engage with accounts outside the network, except to harass critics of the Chinese government and other targets; here, the engagement is consistently supportive, suggesting Coolture is operating in coordination with the network.

• Spamouflage-linked accounts: Three of Coolture’s consistent amplifiers, @zairediquezxs, @ihsdfinder, and @hpf_design have posted Spamouflage content targeting Falun Gong, Shen Yun, and Japan. On Aug. 17, 2024, all three posted content targeting Falun Gong or Shen Yun within a 23-minute window.
• Pro-China inauthentic accounts: An additional nine likely inauthentic accounts consistently repost and engage with Coolture alongside pro-China and pro-Russia accounts such as S.L. Kanthan and Sprinter Press. Four appear to be repurposed, and X's location data places two in Taiwan and two in Hong Kong.

Estimative Language Legend

Assessments of Likelihood

Graphika uses the following vocabulary to indicate the likelihood of a hypothesis proving correct. If we are unable to assess likelihood due to limited or non-existent information, we may use terms such as “suggest.”

Confidence Levels: Indicators of Sourcing and Corroboration

Graphika uses confidence levels to indicate the quality of information, sources, and corroboration underpinning our assessments.