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Research Reports/Save the Date for Spamouflage
GatedJul 13, 2026

Save the Date for Spamouflage

Chinese State-Linked Influence Operation Spreads Manipulated Event Flyers Online to Disrupt Events Critical of China

Influence Operations
Margot Fulde-Hardy
Margot Fulde-Hardy
Analyst
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Save the Date for Spamouflage

Through Graphika’s intelligence monitoring, we recently observed the Chinese state-linked influence operation Spamouflage disseminate manipulated versions of event flyers – a novel tactic for the operation – to attempt to disrupt anti-Communist Party of China (CPC) events organized in the U.S. and Europe. In June and July 2026, the influence operation leveraged inauthentic accounts on Facebook and X to spread these flyers and misleading and incorrect information about an event organized by the Spain-based human rights organization Safeguard Defenders and protests from pro-Tibet and Uyghur organizations. These were likely attempts to hinder the proper execution of or participation in the events.

Graphika has monitored Spamouflage (also tracked as Dragonbridge, Taizi Flood, and Empire Dragon) since 2019, closely following the tactics it uses to spread pro-China and anti-Western narratives across dozens of social media platforms. Pro-China and Chinese state actors have also previously attempted to disrupt or cancel anti-CPC events. For example, in 2024, Chinese diplomats reportedly attempted to pressure lawmakers from several countries to forgo attending an Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China conference in Taiwan. Yet, the instances in June and July were the first time we have observed Spamouflage engage in this specific behavior.

We assess that this tactic could likely be used for other attempts at transnational repression or election interference.

Written By
Margot Fulde-Hardy

Margot Fulde-Hardy

Analyst

Margot Fulde-Hardy researches Chinese online influence operations targeting global audiences. Additionally, she conducts investigations related to foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns targeting electoral contexts. Margot is also a FIMI-ISAC member and co-chair of OASIS Open source project DAD-CDM technical steering committee, where she supports the research on creating a common data model for FIMI campaigns, drawing on her expertise on STIX, TTPs, and OpenCTI.

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